

**Administrative Failure in Bosnia:
United Nations Crisis Management During the Fall of Srebrenica**

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Abstract

On July 11, 1995 nearly 8,000 Bosniac men and boys were massacred following the fall of the United Nations Protected Area at Srebrenica. The massacre along with the displacement of over 25,000 refugees was carried out by the Bosnian Serb Army as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign aimed at eradicating the Bosnian Muslim population from their shared homeland. This case study highlights limitations in crisis management response and preparedness within the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Field Services offices. This paper investigates the struggle between the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the Army of the Republika Srpska in the days preceding the safe area take over by Bosnian Serb forces. Exploration of these events reveals imbedded value conflicts internal to UN administration. As such, this case offers key areas of applicability to the study of public administration and crisis management. First, the case highlights a failure to coordinate international communications systems, specifically, in addressing language barriers between Dutch UN peacekeeping forces on the ground and the UN Peacekeeping Headquarters. Second, the case explores political implications of the UN “impartiality” doctrine. As such, the case addresses issues of implementation failure in the policy making process. Special Representative to the Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi withheld NATO air strikes as a preventive measure, and in doing so he directly circumvented UN policy guidelines. The fall of Srebrenica reveals inadequate international political will as reflected in the weak mandate provided to UN forces, and a lack of anticipation of the crisis within Bosnia by the international community.

Methodologically, this case study employs a qualitative data-gathering approach, which will feature data from expert interviews, witness accounts from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pertinent local and international news releases, and the UN official report of the incident. In addition, the case will be presented with in-depth maps and charts illustrating the geographic positioning of forces during the crisis, as well as the proximity and structure of the UN chain of command.

Introduction

Crises within United Nations peacekeeping missions can be particularly complex due to various elements, such as lack of a strong UN mandate, poor organizational and logistical planning and support, and lack of political backing of the mission. Instability within the UN can be compounded with the instability within a region, and can devolve into a large scale, international crisis with the capacity for heightened loss of human life, loss of regional stability, and the ultimate loss of confidence in the ability of international organizations to maintain world order. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping operation deployed to the Srebrenica safe area in the former Yugoslavia during the Bosnian War from 1992 through 1995 exemplifies this type of crisis. The genocide that occurred following the fall of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces on July 11, 1995, and the crisis experienced within the UN forces during the final stretches of the Bosnian War are especially worthy of study within a crisis management and implementation context. Not only is it beneficial to explore crises at an international level, but also a greater understanding of the crisis management mechanisms that international organizations have in place is increasingly important as the number of international peacekeeping cases continues to grow.¹ This case study is also important in the context of management of nongovernmental organizations and other public agencies that are involved with international actors and situations that require further in-depth knowledge of international crisis management.

The overall aim of this case study is to further examine governance in a value laden administrative state. The administrative structure under examination is that of the UN, and the policies that are under scrutiny are those impacting the ability of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping

¹ NPR, "Ongoing Debate Over U.S. Intervention in Libya," <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/14/134538297/ongoing-debate-over-u-s-intervention-in-libya> (accessed March 20, 2011).

mission in Bosnia to implement resolutions and communicate with UN headquarters. A majority of the member nations meeting at the UN headquarters in New York were reluctant to put any real force behind the numerous resolutions that were passed pertaining to the Bosnian War, as no states wanted to become newly embroiled in a war with Serbia. As a result of the cautious political atmosphere, there lacked an international political will and anticipation of the crisis at Srebrenica by the international community. This case study will further bring to light the political contexts that can obstruct successful policy implementation in a crisis situation.

The History of Peacekeeping and the Balkan Crisis

The shocking and violent atrocities committed during World War II sparked such a strong response among the Western powers that the protection of humanity became a necessary world goal. Amidst cries of “never again,” the international community created an organization that would protect future generations from the blight of war, promote freedom and the protection of basic human rights, and create a framework of agreements and treaties by which the peoples of the world could foster more just and respectful relations among nations. Such a mechanism has evolved into the United Nations that we know of today.

However, the goals for which the UN was created have not always been easy to uphold. Since the inception of the UN, several national and international crises have occurred, which have triggered the international community to deploy peacekeeping forces. Although the phrase “peacekeeping” is never expressly mentioned in the UN Charter signed in 1945, the second elected Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, described peacekeeping as existing in a figurative chapter six and a half of the Charter. These measures would expand upon methods of negotiation and mediation mentioned in Chapter VI, but peacekeeping personnel would be

deployed prior to the use of more forceful methods described in Chapter VII.² Nevertheless, crises have arisen no matter the extent to which peacekeeping operations have evolved since they were first deployed in 1948.

Within the Baltic region, the struggle among the Croat, Serb, and Bosnian Muslim, or Bosniac, populations has been ongoing since the eighteenth century. The era prior to World War I was marked by Slavic revolts against their Ottoman rulers and deteriorating political conditions. Although Austria-Hungary soon took over administration of the region, tensions remained and nationalism grew among the Slavic people. Following World War I, the Western nations granted the region independence, creating the independent Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, this principality still had difficulty establishing itself as ethnic nationalism grew and derailed most political initiatives. When World War II raged across the continent, Croat leaders who had ceded to the Nazi invaders set up death camps for all former opposition groups including Serbs, Jews, Roma, and communists.³ In response, the Serb Chetniks shifted their goals from combating the Croat-Nazi regime to the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. When Josip Broz Tito gained popularity in 1941, he formed the Partisans, a communist group that combated the Nazis and the Chetniks for the remainder of the war throughout modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴ The country enjoyed a brief respite from ethnic violence as Tito established the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in 1943 and led the country until his death in 1980.

By 1990, several political parties had formed along ethnic-nationalist platforms, and one of the more prominent political figures was Slobodan Milosevic, leader of the League of

² United Nations Peacekeeping, "Peacekeeping Home," <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> (accessed November 22, 2010).

³ BBC News, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Timeline," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1066981.stm> (accessed November 22, 2010).

⁴ Ibid.

Communists of Serbia. The breakup of the country along ethnic lines seemed imminent as Slovenia and Croatia both declared their secession from Yugoslavia in 1991. A larger conflict spread to Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina, as large minorities of Serbs living in these regions fought to retain territories for the Serbian homeland. Macedonia soon declared independence, and by late 1992 the conflict in Bosnia became the focal point of the breakup of the former Yugoslav federation, as it too declared its separation from the Socialist Republic.

The Foundations of an International Policy Response

As the fighting within the region worsened, the international community took notice by late 1991. Cyrus Vance, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, first suggested the Vance Peace Plan, which proposed a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia.⁵ The Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, further endorsed this proposal by submitting a report to the Security Council recommending the establishment of a peacekeeping operation for the troubled region. Resolution 743 established the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in February 1992 in order to further implement the Vance Plan within the region.⁶ Dissatisfaction and a lack of consensus with the renamed Vance-Owen Plan kept it from approval by the warring parties in the spring of 1993.⁷ UNPROFOR headquarters were then established at Sarajevo the following month, and would represent a major body of interaction with the warring parties.

As the humanitarian situation rapidly deteriorated, attention on Bosnia by the Security Council intensified and almost fifty resolutions were adopted pertaining to the conflict. Until this

⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica*, (November 1999), p. 8.

⁶ It should be noted that the three main branches discussing this crisis were the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat. Most of the resolutions passed pertaining to the war in the former Yugoslavia were passed within the Security Council. As well, there has been some dispute within international law as to the binding nature of Security Council resolutions. Those resolutions passed under the auspices of Chapter VI of the UN Charter are seen as non-binding, while those resolutions associated with Chapter VII are binding on member states. Franz Sucharipa Cede, and Lilly Behrmann, "United Nations: Law and Practice," *Brill Academic Publishers* (2001): p. 70.

⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 12.

time, no other issue had produced this many resolutions and statements from the Security Council over an equivalent period of time.⁸ Although there was considerable discussion and activity surrounding the issue, a consensus on the most appropriate type of action among member nations was still lacking.⁹ In the context of the public administration literature, scholars have noted the importance in recognizing that there are multiple stakeholders in the decision-making process, and to balance swift action with proper reflection.¹⁰

It was suggested by August of 1992 by the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Cornelio Sommaruga, that an effective method for protection of vulnerable civilian populations in contested areas was to establish demilitarized “safe areas” that could be protected by UNPROFOR forces, while a ceasefire was further negotiated. The idea was debated for some time within the international community, as key figures cautioned that the policy would further ethnic cleansing and support the military objectives of the warring sides by allowing them to launch attacks from the safe areas.¹¹ However, further deliberation was cut short in April 1993 when the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, reported that the Bosniacs living in Srebrenica were convinced that the Bosnian Serbs would soon attempt to take over the area, and remaining in the town meant certain death. On April 13, Serb commanders declared that they would take the town in two days unless it surrendered and the Bosniac population was evacuated.¹² This was further complicated as the Bosniac Government was opposed to further evacuations, and saw this as means to assist Serb offensives by emptying the town of its women and children. By April 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 819, which declared the

⁸ Ibid., p. 16.

⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰ Uriel Rosenthal, “September 11: Public Administration and the Study of Crises and Crisis Management,” *Administration & Society* 35.2 (2003): p. 134.

¹¹ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 17.

¹² Ibid., p. 18.

area surrounding Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihac as UN Protected Areas (UNPA). UNPROFOR forces were soon assigned to the localities, and the following month both the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniacs had agreed to demilitarize and respect the UNPAs.¹³

Important International and Local Actors

Marrack Goulding, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, reported to the Security Council in May 1992 that the warring parties were targeting civilian populations with the goal of creating ethnically pure territories.¹⁴ One of the chief actors in the conflict was the newly formed Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), which was representative of the Bosnian Muslim population that comprised 44 percent of the country's inhabitants. Assisting the Bosniacs was the Bosnian Croat population, which made up 17 percent of Bosnia's inhabitants, and which established the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV). The opposition to these forces was the Bosnian Serb population, which was strongly supported by neighboring Serbia, and formed the Army of the Republicka Srpska (VRS) headed by General Ratko Mladic. Within the newly established Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina both warring sides formed parallel governments, as the Republic elected a Bosniac, Alija Izetbegovic, as President and the newly created Republicka Srpska elected Radovan Karadzic as President.

The intervening international community was largely represented through the UN, which was supported technically by its member nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the outset, the UNPROFOR mandate was related only to Croatia, but the mandate was soon accelerated and strengthened in light of the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia. Unfortunately, compliance to sanctions and restrictions passed by resolutions within the Security

¹³ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), "Rule 61 Transcript, July 3, 1996," p. 534

¹⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 10.

Council did not meet with the intended response of curbing the violence. Although the Bosniacs and Croats were the supportive parties of the peace operation,¹⁵ Izetbegovic, his government, and the ARBiH were often critical of UNPROFOR for its perceived shortcomings.¹⁶ As well, headquarters for the peacekeeping force were soon moved to Zagreb, as Sarajevo became too violent and dangerous to support the UNPF-HQ's everyday operations.

The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was abandoned in the spring of 1993, and a push for strengthening of the safe area policy began within the UN administration. A working paper presented to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali determined that the approval of the policy must be forthcoming from both sides and a ceasefire must be respected in order for the safe areas to be respected. As well, the UNPROFOR forces that would be stationed at each safe area would need to be capable of defending against possible aggression with as many as 15,000 troops present.¹⁷ Even though the working paper was soon passed as Resolution 836, the bombardment of the safe areas by Bosnian Serb forces continued at the same rate, and member nations were reluctant to commit the necessary increase in troops to successfully implement the safe area policy. Thus the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate to include the capacity to deter attacks on safe areas could only be a function of the presence of the peacekeeping troops stationed in Srebrenica. At this time, Srebrenica was viewed as a positive example of how UN presence was capable of deterring attacks by Bosnian Serb forces.¹⁸ When troop reinforcements were still lacking six months later, the exasperated UNPROFOR commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared that there was, "a fantastic gap between the resolutions, the will to execute the resolutions, and the

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁶ Department of Public Information, "Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR," United Nations, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 22.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

means available to commanders in the field.”¹⁹ As such, within the literature it is observed that a mismatch of means and ends may disrupt policy implementation.²⁰ Scholars of public administration observe that equally important is the identification of the critical task that organizations desire to accomplish.²¹

Within the UN offices confusion as to a clear chain of command inside the region was developing. At the New York Headquarters, multiple offices answering to the Secretary-General were handling the developing crisis in Bosnia. Within the Secretariat, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, was overseeing the organization of the shared active roles within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. Akashi split responsibility of the mission with a military commander. As reflected in the reluctance by member nations to commit troops to the endeavor, many countries did not want to risk becoming newly entangled in a war with Serbia.²² Within the UN a distinctive push-pull policy began to form as public opinion pushed states to act, while state self-interest sought pull back and avoidance of war. Thus the peacekeeping forces were left with one main policy of coercive means, which consisted of NATO-led air strikes.²³ Yet, Akashi in particular represented the school of thought within the UN that intervention impartiality was important above all else, such that a ceasefire would be respected most if the third party does not favor one side over another.²⁴ Because he feared a policy of force would compromise the UN mission, Akashi often

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

²⁰ Jeffery Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, *Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984: p. xxv.

²¹ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, New York: Basic Books, 2000: p. 25.

²² Dr. Jan Honig, interview by Katherine Cook, November 1, 2010.

²³ Jan Honig, “Avoiding War, Inviting Defeat: The Srebrenica Crisis, July 1995,” *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 9.4 (2001): p. 205.

²⁴ Dr. Jan Honig, interview by Katherine Cook, November 1, 2010.

hesitated and denied requests for air support from the field.²⁵ This aspect of policy implementation is particularly notable within the literature, which found that the definition of goals and problems are intertwined with political value conflicts and public opinion, and thus continuously evolving.²⁶

By February 1994, a Dutch battalion was stationed in the Srebrenica safe area, replacing the Canadian battalion already there, and two companies of 600 troops protected the area.²⁷ In the town of Srebrenica, the UN Dutch B Company (B Coy) compound was established, while Company C (C Coy) operated from the safe area headquarters in the nearby village of Potocari.²⁸ Further complication within the chain of command was visible in the communication and organizational structure of the field offices. Within the UN it was particularly noted that member states feared that those in the field would become too decisive on issues and make the wrong decision.²⁹ In Srebrenica, the Dutch battalion commander was Colonel Thom Karremans, who did not have good connections with higher command. This was particularly due to a language barrier, as the Dutch Colonel did not speak English well, so he most often reported to another Dutch official at Tuzla who was not his immediate superior.³⁰ In addition, the officer at Tuzla communicated with the Dutch chief of staff at UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, and all three communicated directly with The Hague.³¹ This dynamic in particular illustrates the dichotomy between the authority and decision-making capabilities of actors in the field versus

²⁵ Honig 2001, p. 205.

²⁶ Wilson 2000, p. 35.

²⁷ ICTY, July 3, p. 525.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 622.

²⁹ Honig 2001, p. 205.

³⁰ Dr. Jan Honig, interview by Katherine Cook, November 1, 2010.

³¹ ICTY, July 3, p. 605.

the authority and decision-making capabilities of elected officials, and highlights the importance of interconnected and reliable communication systems.³²

The State of Srebrenica: April 1992-June 1995

Srebrenica is located in the eastern tip of Bosnia, close to the Drina River, which marks the Bosnian-Serb border. Prior to the start of the Bosnian War, 73 percent of the town's 7,000 residents were Muslim and only 25 percent were Serb.³³ Once the war began in 1992, Serb paramilitaries were able to take control of the area, forcing Bosniac troops to flee the area. By May, Bosniacs forces had retaken the city and expelled most of the Serb population. There were various Bosniac battalions without a distinct military structure present within the enclave, and a violent rivalry soon developed among the factions. Naser Oric, leader of the 28th Mountain Division of the ARBiH, quickly lead his group to become one of the more powerful in the region. Oric lead several raids that expanded the Bosnian Muslim enclave at Srebrenica, which is surrounded by Serb villages. Thus violence by both the ARBiH and the VRS were perpetrated against civilians in an effort to promote ethnic cleansing.³⁴ This violence had forced a large number of civilians to seek refuge within the UNPA. By March 1993, Serb forces began to plan a counter-attack that would end Bosniac control of Srebrenica. Fighting continued within the enclave throughout 1994 and 1995, and starvation was rampant as the VRS often blockaded the enclave from supply convoys.³⁵ By 1995, several ceasefire resolutions had been attempted, but neither side had respected the final agreement.³⁶ Prior to the final offensive against Srebrenica,

³² Kirsten Lundberg, "When Imperatives Collide: The 2003 San Diego Firestorm," Kennedy School of Government Case Program 1814.0 (2005): p. 2.

³³ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 13.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁵ The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), "Rule 61 Transcript, July 4, 1996," p. 4.

³⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General*, p. 16.

there were an estimated 40,000 residents and refugees living within the safe area, along with almost 4,000 Bosniac military personnel.³⁷

The Final Days at Srebrenica:

July 2-July 8

Due to the siege conditions within Srebrenica, the VRS begin a blockade of the area, keeping supply convoys from entering the enclave after February of 1995. This produced great difficulties in maintaining food supplies for the refugees staying there, as well as rotating out Dutch troops. Reinforcement arrived for the VRS, leading local observers to believe that a full-scale attack on the enclave was imminent.³⁸ On July 2, 1995, General-Major Milenko Zivanovic, Commander of the VRS Drina Corps located in Srebrenica, signed off on the proposed plan, Krivaja 95, which detailed a line of attack that would reduce the safe area to the Srebrenica urban center.³⁹

A few days later on the evening of July 5, a few Bosnian Serb soldiers entered the enclave. The Dutch observation posts surrounding the safe area came under fire, and were abandoned, one after the other. The next morning, about 55 Dutch troops were taken hostage as they attempted to flee the advancing Serb army and shelling of the observation posts.⁴⁰ Dutch Commander Colonel Karremans called his superiors and pleaded for close air support, but his requests were not granted.⁴¹ The next few days marked the start of the attack on Srebrenica by Serb forces, and supplies started to dwindle as no fresh food had been brought into the enclave for several months. Many of the Bosniac men requested the weapons that they had forfeited to

³⁷ ICTY, July 3, p. 594.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ BBC News, "Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica," <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/675945.stm> (accessed November 22, 2010).

⁴¹ ICTY, July 4, p. 8.

UN personnel upon entering the safe area, but they were denied.⁴² More and more civilians were forced to flee into Srebrenica and into the UN Dutch B Coy compound as the surrounding villages were continuously bombarded by the VRS. There were only about 600 lightly armed Dutch infantry.

July 9-10

The days leading up to the fall of the UNPA experienced a heightened tension that was widely noticed not only locally, but also by some international actors. On July 9th, the UN sent an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb troops, calling for their withdrawal by 6 AM the next morning and threatening air strikes by NATO planes if the ultimatum was not heeded. Regardless of this threat, Karadzic issued the order for VRS Drina Corps to take Srebrenica. The next day, concerned civilians were unsure of what to do as more and more people took refuge within the town. Some of the men decided to flee to Tuzla, while the Dutch troops anticipated an influx of 25,000 refugees at Potocari, their headquarters within the safe area. The mayor of Srebrenica issued a warning to the international community, stating that “at the moment the tanks are moving in on Srebrenica, and if the international community does not intervene, these people and this town will suffer a catastrophe.”⁴³

In response to the UN ultimatum, General Mladic issued a counter ultimatum calling for the surrender of the Bosnian Army within 24 hours, and for the Dutch troops to turn away refugees from the UN compound. NATO planes attempted to bomb the Serb armaments, but visibility was too poor. Plans to continue to shell VRS artillery were scrapped when VRS threatened to both kill the Dutch peacekeepers that they had taken hostage and shell the Bosniac civilians gathered at UNPROFOR headquarters. Colonel Karremans continued to request air

⁴² BBC, “Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica.”

⁴³ Hajrudin Avdic, “Srebrenica mayor warns Serb tanks moving in on town,” Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 Jul 1995.

support after the Bosnian Serb Army shelled UNPROFOR observation posts. But Karreman's request was refused twice by General Bernard Janvier, the Lieutenant-General of forces in the former Yugoslavia in Zagreb.

July 11

On July 11, at the ultimatum of Mladic, some 15,000 civilians gathered at the Dutch B Coy compound, anticipating NATO air strikes to come to their defense. As soon as some civilians managed to find a way inside, the VRS ultimatum went into effect and three shells were launched at the panicking crowd. It remains unknown how many were hurt or injured, but evacuation of the area began as the crowd started to flee for the Dutch HQ at Potocari. The shelling continued as people fled four kilometers up the road, and gathered around the Dutch main compound.⁴⁴ NATO air strikes were launched late in the morning, but upon seeing that the air strikes would not stop the assault, Oric and the Bosniac army decided to retreat from Srebrenica. Soon the compound at Potocari was overrun with civilians, and as there was not enough room to let everyone in to safety, the crowds were directed to take shelter in large factories in the area. After the evacuation of Srebrenica to Potocari, General Mladic threatened to destroy the Dutch compound, but he did not act on this threat.

Those that stayed behind in Srebrenica were gathered on the town's soccer field. It is unknown how many were executed, but Serb soldiers have confessed to the killing of at least one Muslim civilian.⁴⁵ As the shelling by the Bosnian Serb Army continued, civilians begin to congregate in a village near Potocari called Susnjari. Those who gathered were mostly men and boys who were fit to serve in the military, and who did not want to end up in the hands of the

⁴⁴ ICTY, July 3, p. 528.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

VRS. Civilians followed the soldiers into the town and waited until nightfall to continue on to Muslim territory.

July 12-16

By July 12th, almost 100,000 Bosniac soldiers and civilians had gathered at Susnjari, and began to move to Tuzla. As the column of people fled towards safety, multiple bombings by Bosnian Serb forces disrupted and confused them, and two ambushes occurred along the road. The ambushes were violent and many were gunned down. As the column began to break apart amidst the confusion, groups of Bosniacs were captured by the VRS. That same morning in Potocari, Mladic's forces finally reached the town and blocked the civilians from leaving. Generals Mladic and Zivanovic met with Colonel Karremans in the nearby town of Brantunac to discuss the dire situation within the enclave and Mladic requested the surrender of all ARBiH troops.⁴⁶ Following the meeting, Mladic informed the remaining civilians that they would be evacuated, as buses arrived to transport them to Muslim territory. En route, the women and children were separated from the men, and nearly 23,000 women were transported to Muslim territory.⁴⁷ The remaining men and boys were kept by Serb forces in warehouses and schools throughout the area, and they were summarily executed. By July 16th, reports of the massacres began to reach the outside world, and it was soon discovered that nearly 8,000 Bosniac men and boys had been massacred and buried in mass graves.

Conclusion

This case study can ultimately be considered a failure of crisis management, as safe area policy was not respected and the Dutch peacekeepers were unable to protect the Muslim population at Srebrenica. The UN administrative structure and policies that impacted the ability

⁴⁶ ICTY, July 4, p. 11

⁴⁷ BBC, "Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica."

of UNPROFOR to communicate with UN headquarters did not reflect effective crisis management strategy. As well, there was a considerable disconnect between the observations and decision-making capabilities of actors in the field in comparison with the authority and decision-making capabilities of the elected officials at UN headquarters. The cautious political atmosphere within the international community also interfered with the implementation of numerous UN Security Council resolutions aimed at quelling the violence. Thus, this case study illustrates how administrative structure and strategy play integral roles in successful crisis management, and political contexts can facilitate or obstruct policy implementation in crisis situations.

This bears several implications as to the nature of effective crisis management. A comprehensive strategy that takes into account the various agencies and actors in the decision-making process, while also balancing swift action with proper reflection is an invaluable tool to administrators in the midst of a crisis. As well, it is important for administrators to be conscious of the intricate nature of policy implementation, such that decisions in implementation rely on complex reciprocal interactions, and goals are intertwined in value conflicts and public opinion. Yet most importantly, administrators must keep in mind that the ultimate goal of crisis management is to serve and protect the public good.

APPENDIX A: Timeline of Events

Date	Event
June 1991	Slovenia declares independence from the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Fighting lasts only 11 days, and the JNA retreat into Croatia.
June 1991	Croatia declares independence from Yugoslavia.
September 1991	Macedonia declares independence from Yugoslavia.
February 21, 1992	UN Protection Force established through Resolution 743.
April 1992	Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence from Yugoslavia. The Republicka Srpska is established as the Bosnian Serb government within Bosnian territory.
March 1993	President of the Republicka Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, rejects the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Serb forces near Srebrenica begin planning counter-attack to retake the territory.
April 16, 1993	Resolution 819 declared the area surrounding Srebrenica a demilitarized “safe area.” UN peacekeeping troops were assigned to the area.
May 8, 1993	Demilitarization agreement signed by both the Bosniacs and Serbs, further solidifying the UN safe area policy.
February 1994	Dutch battalion first stationed in the safe area, replacing the Canadian battalion already there.
May 1995	The VRS begin a blockade of Srebrenica, which kept supply convoys from entering the enclave.
July 2, 1995	General-Major Milenko Zivanovic signs off on the original offensive, Krivaja 95, to reduce safe area to the Srebrenica urban center.
July 5, 1995	That evening a few Bosnian Serb soldiers enter the enclave, and the observation posts set up by the Dutch troops come under fire.
July 6-8, 1995	Start of attack on Srebrenica by Serb forces. Bosniacs request the weapons that they had forfeited to UN personnel upon entering the safe area, but they are denied. Civilians are forced to flee into Srebrenica and into the UN Dutch B Coy compound as the surrounding villages are continuously bombarded by the VRS.
July 9, 1995	The UN sends an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serb troops, calling for their withdrawal by 6 am the next morning or there would be air strikes. Karadzic issues order to VRS Drina Corps to take Srebrenica.
July 10, 1995	Concerned civilians are unsure of what to do as more and more people take refuge within the town. Dutch troops anticipate an influx of 25,000 refugees at Potocari. As peacekeeping forces begin to retreat, about 30 Dutch troops are taken hostage by the VRS. In response to the UN ultimatum, General Mladic issues a counter ultimatum calling for the surrender of the Bosnian Army within 24 hours, and for the Dutch troops to turn away refugees from the UN compound. Commander Thom Karremans requests air support after the Bosnian Serb Army shelled UNPROFOR observation posts. Initially, his request is refused by General Bernard Janvier, but was finally agreed to. NATO planes attempted bombing, but visibility was too poor. Plans to continue to shell VRS artillery were scrapped when they threatened to kill the Dutch peacekeepers that they had taken hostage and shell the Bosniac civilians gathered at UNPROFOR headquarters.
July 11, 1995	At the ultimatum of Mladic, some 15,000 civilians gather at the Dutch B Coy compound, anticipating NATO air strikes. As soon as some civilians manage to find a way inside, the ultimatum goes into effect and three shells are launched at the

	panicking crowd. Evacuation of the area begins as the crowd flees for UNPROFOR HQ at Potocari. The shelling continues as people flee four kilometers up the road, and gather around the Dutch main compound.
July 12, 1995	Mladic's forces reach Potocari, and he meets with Colonel Karremans at Brantunac.
July 13-16, 1995	Evacuation by the VRS of Muslim civilians begins, and the men and women are separated. Mass executions of Bosniac men and boys take place in Srebrenica and in its surrounding areas.

APPENDIX B: List of UN Resolutions pertaining to the Bosnian War and UNPROFOR⁴⁸

Resolution	Date	Vote	Subject
713	25-Sep-91	15-0-0	European Community efforts, arms embargo in the SFR Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav Wars
721	27-Nov-91	15-0-0	Secretary-General's efforts in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Yugoslav Wars
724	15-Dec-91	15-0-0	Establishes Security Council Committee concerning Yugoslav Wars
727	8-Jan-92	15-0-0	European Union Monitoring Mission in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
740	7-Feb-92	15-0-0	Peacekeeping plan for the SFR Yugoslavia during Yugoslav Wars
743	21-Feb-92	15-0-0	Establishes the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
749	7-Apr-92	15-0-0	The United Nations Protection Force
752	15-May-92	15-0-0	The Bosnian War
753	18-May-92	Adopted without vote	Admission of Croatia to the United Nations
754	18-May-92	Adopted without vote	Admission of Slovenia to the United Nations
755	20-May-92	Adopted without vote	Admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations
757	30-May-92	13-0-2 (abstentions: China, Zimbabwe)	Imposes economic sanctions, embargo on the Serbia and Montenegro
758	8-Jun-92	15-0-0	Enlarges United Nations Protection Force; violations of ceasefire in Bosnia
760	18-Jun-92	15-0-0	Sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
761	29-Jun-92	15-0-0	Calls for additional deployments of the United Nations Protection Force
802	25-Jan-93	15-0-0	Croatian Army actions in the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia
807	19-Feb-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force
808	22-Feb-93	15-0-0	Proposals for the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
815	30-Mar-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force
816	31-Mar-93	14-0-1 (abstention: China)	Extends ban on military flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina
817	7-Apr-93	15-0-0	Admission of the Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations as the "former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"
819	16-Apr-93	15-0-0	Demands that Srebrenica and the surrounding areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, be treated as a safe area
820	17-Apr-93	13-0-2 (abstentions: China, Russia)	Peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, further sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

⁴⁸ Department of Public Information, "Security Council: Resolutions," United Nations (2009), <<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>>.


821	28-Apr-93	13-0-2 (abstentions: China, Russia)	Non-participation of Yugoslavia in the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
824	6-May-93	15-0-0	Treatment of certain towns and surroundings in Bosnia and Herzegovina as safe areas
827	25-May-93	15-0-0	Establishes the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
836	4-Jun-93	13-0-2 (abstentions: Pakistan, Venezuela)	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force, use of "necessary measures" to protect safe areas
838	10-Jun-93	15-0-0	Options for deployment of international observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina
842	18-Jun-93	15-0-0	Contribution of additional personnel to United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Macedonia
843	18-Jun-93	15-0-0	Confirms the Committee established by 724 (1991) is entrusted with examining requests for assistance
844	18-Jun-93	15-0-0	Authorization of the reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force
847	30-Jun-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force and situation in Croatia
855	9-Aug-93	14-0-1 (abstention: China)	Serbia and Montenegro's refusal to allow OSCE special missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina
857	20-Aug-93	15-0-0	Nominations of judges for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
859	24-Aug-93	15-0-0	Comprehensive political settlement of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
868	29-Sep-93	15-0-0	Establishes new safety mandates for United Nations peacekeepers
869	30-Sep-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force
870	1-Oct-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force
871	4-Oct-93	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force, peacekeeping plan for Croatia
877	21-Oct-93	Adopted without vote	Appoints Ramón Escovar-Salom as Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
900	4-Mar-94	15-0-0	Restoration of essential public services and normal life in and around Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina
908	31-Mar-94	15-0-0	Extends mandate and increase in personnel of the United Nations Protection Force
913	22-Apr-94	15-0-0	Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and safe area of Goražde, settlement of conflict
914	27-Apr-94	15-0-0	Additional increase in personnel of the United Nations Protection Force
936	8-Jul-94	15-0-0	Appoints Richard Goldstone as Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

941	23-Sep-94	15-0-0	Violations of international humanitarian law in Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina
942	23-Sep-94	14-0-1 (abstention: China)	Reinforces measures concerning safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under control of Bosnian Serb forces
943	23-Sep-94	11-2-2 (against: Djibouti, Pakistan; abstentions: Nigeria, Rwanda)	Closure of border between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, excluding humanitarian aid
947	30-Sep-94	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force, implementation of peace plan for Croatia and Security Council resolutions
958	19-Nov-94	15-0-0	Permits the use of air strikes in Croatia in addition to Bosnia and Herzegovina
959	19-Nov-94	15-0-0	Efforts of the United Nations Protection Force to ensure implementation of Security Council resolutions in safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina
967	14-Dec-94	15-0-0	Permits export of diphtheria antiserum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for 30 days
970	12-Jan-95	14-0-1 (abstention: Russia)	Closure of border between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, excluding humanitarian aid
981	31-Mar-95	15-0-0	Establishes the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
982	31-Mar-95	15-0-0	Extends the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force, operations in Croatia
987	19-Apr-95	15-0-0	Security and safety of the United Nations Protection Force
988	21-Apr-95	13-0-2 (abstentions: China, Russia)	Extends partial suspension of certain sanctions against Yugoslavia
990	28-Apr-95	15-0-0	Authorizes deployment of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
994	17-May-95	15-0-0	Withdrawal of the Croatian troops from the zone of separation, full deployment of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
998	16-Jun-95	13-0-2 (abstentions: China, Russia)	Establishes rapid-reaction force within the United Nations Protection Force
1003	5-Jul-95	14-0-1 (abstention: Russia)	Further extends partial suspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
1004	12-Jul-95	15-0-0	Demands withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from safe areas of

			Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina
1009	10-Aug-95	15-0-0	Compliance of Croatia with United Nations Protection Force agreement; right of local Serb population to receive humanitarian aid
1010	10-Aug-95	15-0-0	Access by international agencies to Srebrenica and Žepa; release of detained persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1015	15-Sep-95	15-0-0	Further suspends sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
1016	21-Sep-95	15-0-0	Military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1019	9-Nov-95	15-0-0	Violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia
1021	22-Nov-95	14-0-1 (abstention: Russia)	Termination of arms embargo upon signing of peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia
1022	22-Nov-95	14-0-1 (abstention: Russia)	Suspends measures in previous resolutions related to the former Yugoslavia
1023	22-Nov-95	15-0-0	Agreement between Government of Croatia and local Serb representatives
1025	30-Nov-95	15-0-0	Proposal for termination of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
1026	30-Nov-95	15-0-0	Extends mandate of the United Nations Protection Force
1031	15-Dec-95	15-0-0	Implementation of peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina; transfer from United Nations Protection Force to Implementation Force
1034	21-Dec-95	15-0-0	Violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the former Yugoslavia
1035	21-Dec-95	15-0-0	Establishes the International Police Task Force and civilian office for implementation of peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina
1047	29-Feb-96	15-0-0	Appoints Louise Arbour as Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia
1074	1-Oct-96	15-0-0	Terminates measures against the former Yugoslavia following elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

APPENDIX C: UN Organizational Charts:
Figure 1: UNPROFOR and UN Command Organizational Chart⁴⁹


Command organization - Chart template (UNPROFOR)



⁴⁹ http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/no_spe_chefs_francais/version_us/art06.pdf


Figure 2: UN Policy for Peacekeeping Operational Structure⁵⁰

Figure 5 Authority, Command and Control in Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations




⁵⁰ Guehenno, Jean-Marie, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2008): p. 67.

Figure 3: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support⁵¹




⁵¹ http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/dpkodfs_org_chart.pdf

APPENDIX D: Maps of the Region
Map 1: Map of the Crisis, July 8-14, 1995⁵²



⁵² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Srebrenica_massacre_map.jpg

Map 2: Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991⁵³
 Ethnic composition before the war in BiH (1991)



Map 3: Current composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina⁵⁴
 Federation of BiH



⁵³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Eth_relations_1991_bih.gif
⁵⁴ <http://www.pcgn.org.uk/Bosnia-Aug06.pdf>

APPENDIX E: Transcript of Dr. Jan Honig Interview 11/1/10

Question: Who made the main decisions during the crisis since Rupert Smith was on leave at the time?

Honig: You mean on the UNPROFOR side ... the chain of command works in a rather confusing manner, you got the colonel, Dutch Colonel, whose connections with the higher command are not particularly good. He responds to the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo ... sorry, that's not correct, his immediate superior is in Tuzla, where there is a regional command station ... and he speaks there mostly with a southern Dutch officer, who is actually not the guy in charge, but he's the one he can talk to most easily and most directly, partly probably because the English of the Dutch Colonel is not particularly good. So he talks to the Dutch officer in Tuzla but at the same time he also talks to UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo where his main connection is another Dutch officer, the chief of staff who sort of keeps going together with a French General, while Smith is away on holiday. And above them is a higher command in Zagreb with a French General with a whole team of people that hold regular staff meetings. And to pinpoint exactly who is responsible for what is not so easy.

Question: You also mention within the article that the command structure was complex by nature; can you elaborate more on why it was set up this way? Why did the Dutch fear that UN actions would have been "too decisive"?

Honig: One reason for the complexity is that (you don't want them having to do things anyway) if you think of the structure that there is in Afghanistan at the moment or that the U.S. has in Iraq it's complicated as well. But the key thing is that the various governments that sent troops to Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia were very concerned about being newly entangled in a war, and in order to avoid that there is a lot of complicated power structure. In line with the previous answer, there's a lot of political interference, so the colonel in the safe area not only does he reports to the nearby chain of command and makes sure he reports to the national chain of command, he also makes sure he phones the Hague and his own national capital all the time to double check that what he is doing is all right. And the capital itself phones him all the time to make sure the man is not making any mistakes. So the key reason for making it complicated and indecisive is the political nervousness about ending up at war with the Serbs.

Question: Can you tell me more about the reaction of the Dutchbat soldiers to the orders handed down to them by UN officials?

Honig: The Dutch soldiers on the ground were extremely nervous. First of all they don't understand their mandate really well. Secondly, they don't have a particularly good relationship with the local Muslim community. Thirdly, war is a risky, nerve-inducing business, so they don't feel very comfortable; they're not quite sure what they are doing, they don't like the people they're sort of supposed to protect that much anyway, so that results in them not wanting to, they're not too keen on putting their lives on the line, which creates a bit of a command challenge ... At some point there is a decision to be a bit more robust and that leads to some people suffer breakdowns, some people try to avoid getting involved, and ultimately there is a number of soldiers and one company commander who fight. It didn't do much, but that isn't all. The response of the Dutch soldier is understandable on the whole.

Question: Can you explain a little bit more about why they didn't really care for the Muslim population they were supposed to protect?

Honig: One reason is, and you can see that again if you think of how Western or American forces act in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places as well, its not easy for soldiers coming into a war zone to understand what is going on, so the main problem is the Dutch soldiers understanding the dynamics of the conflict, who's who and what do they do, and its easy to jump to all kinds of conclusions on the basis of the outward appearance, which doesn't really reflect how the conflict really works. So the soldiers in the safe area see a lot of people who are refugees, who live in desperate situations, and therefore don't look their best and it is for many people a bit difficult, I guess, to relate to them, and people in those kind of conditions. Second thing is that they do notice that within the safe area a certain amount of the population does reasonably well and seems to be engaged in what we would call organized crime, and seems to maintain order within the enclave in a tough mafia-like fashion. So that creates, a sort of prejudice against parts of the Muslim population. Another problem is that the Muslims don't behave very well when it comes to military operations against the Serbs; they commit various war crimes against the Serbs. So all these things suggest to a lot of the Dutch soldiers that the Muslims are not particularly squeaky clean. And I think in dealing with warring parties, the Serbs and the Muslims who a lot of the soldiers would have said at the time were equally guilty. So the idea that the Dutch are there to protect a particular population, when they see, when they think, when they feel that that population isn't quite playing or quite living up to what they expect a victimized population to be like, it creates a bit of a problem.

Question: What do you believe were the chief value conflicts at work within the UN that contributed to the failure at Srebrenica?

Honig: It was for the UN, if you generalize, quite difficult as well to understand how the conflict was working, and if you don't understand particularly well, as I said before, how the conflict works, and you see lots of people on a daily basis doing lots of awful things, it is easy to become sort of a moral relativist and think that they're all doing it, they're all equally bad. And for the UN, the additional problem was that it made it fairly difficult if you don't understand the conflict very well to come up with any reasonable prediction as to what is likely to happen. And although it would have been very difficult to predict that the Serbs would commit genocide in Srebrenica, it was particularly explained in the book on Srebrenica, that something was going to happen to the safe area Srebrenica, or in all likelihood to the other safe areas as well in 1995, and that they wouldn't be pretty, and although many people recognized that war crimes would be probably committed if there were more military operations, they didn't really want to think too hard about what you could do to prevent it, and whether the neutral position most countries in the UN tried to take was really the most appropriate to, first of all, alleviate the suffering of the population, and secondly, move things along towards some kind of, however imperfect, but at least a better political solution than you have during the early '90s in a state of war.

Question: You mention in the article that Yasushi Akashi wanted to maintain a reputation of impartiality; could you elaborate a bit on the implications of that choice?

Honig: Yes, there is a very strong idea that when the UN intervened it had to be impartial, and it had to at best offer its good offices for parties to negotiate their way out of conflict, and for the parties first of all to between them conclude a ceasefire, and in order to get the parties to agree to a ceasefire and then to agree to some kind of overall settlement, the idea was to help that best by taking no position as to which party might be better than another. And that idea what was gradually, or not so much abandoned by the UN, although gradually as well to some extent, yet ultimately that the warning did in 1995 was the result of the United States with a supporting number of European countries taking sides, and forcing the Serbs in particular, but to some extent the Croats and Bosnians into negotiating a deal that they took.

Question: Do think that that had something to do with that push by the media and general public in those countries to do something and have the conflict end, while the UN was kind of more partial to having it play out?

Honig: There is a general sense by 1995, that the credibility of all these international organizations is at stake and it is at stake because the public opinion in Europe and the U.S. is unhappy with how they are performing, so the UN in their perception is failing, UNPROFOR there is a perception that that is failing, there is a perception that NATO's credibility is also at stake, and then you've got the individual countries, the United States the most powerful country in the world, has seen this develop for so many years, has refused and President Clinton in particular to really get engaged with it, ultimately thinks things are not going to for the reputation or head of state, heads of government, and the states, the countries they represent as well as the international organizations in which countries collaborate, so public opinion is very important, and also are linked to the self-importance and self-perception of these organizations of how important they are. And thirdly the fact that the Serbs in particular seemed to be playing games with organizations like the UN and NATO, and just making a fool out of these organizations and that ultimately annoys and facilitated the intervention in the late summer of 1995.

Question: In your opinion, what do you think was the chief variable of all of these different factors led to the failure of UN forces in managing this crisis?

Honig: The key variable is not so much ... let me discount first the ones that people often say are the key problems. First of all, it's not primarily a failing of the Dutch groups on the front line. Secondly, it's not primarily a failing of limited means, limited resources, or UN forces being too small. Ultimately it is a failing that lies at the political level, so it's not at the practical level with the troops on the ground in Bosnia, it is at the political level, it is ultimately a failing of political will, it is a failing of wanting to understand the conflict and then figuring out the possibilities of doing something about it. And when that will ultimately solidified it in the late summer of 1995, the conflict was ended with fairly limited means, and fairly limited engagement on the ground, which shows I think without belying how with the limited mean aside or the UN forces there, the key factor as its often made out to be and the military tend to make out in most conflicts ... Why did the Americans fail in Iraq for such a long time? Because the forces there were too small. Why did NATO with the U.S. fail in Afghanistan? The forces in the theatre were too small ... I would say that Bosnia is a good example of showing that that is not necessarily always the primary factor, and really one of political will and political understanding; understand it and pop out the will to do something serious.

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